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1 Introduction
Many problems in economics, management and operations research are naturally modeled as
differential games. See Long1 and Jorgensen and Zaccour2,3 for recent updates of the litera-
ture on differential games. The aim of this paper is to identify games for which the certainty
equivalence principle holds. According to Theil,4 certainty equivalence means that a decision
agent who maximizes expected utility and takes actions based on the information available at
the time of taking the decision, may neglect the disturbances and to suppose that the uncertain
elements are settled at their mean values. This is an important property, as it means that the
equilibrium of the deterministic game is robust, in the sense that it continues to be optimal,
even if the system becomes exposed to zero mean random shocks in the state variable. We say
that a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE henceforth) is robust if it is also an MPNE of
an associated stochastic differential game.
It is well known that linear quadratic stochastic dynamic games in which the random source
is independent from both the state variable and the player’s strategies, satisfy the certainty
equivalence principle∗. The question we address in this paper is whether the certainty equivalence
principle holds in other classes of differential games, and how we can identify them. There are
some results in this direction already. Games with linear value functions satisfy this principle.
This is because the second-order derivatives of the value function are null, so the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation system is the same for both the deterministic and the stochastic game.
Relevant examples are Sorger,6 where a non-linear marketing game of advertising is studied, and
Yeung,7 where a class of games with linear value functions is identified. In Kuwana,8 it is shown
that logarithmic utility is the only utility specification that satisfies this property in Merton’s
model with partially observable drift†. Our investigations show that, in a variety of games,
beyond those with logarithmic, quadratic or linear value functions, the certainty equivalence
principle holds. Our starting point, Theorem 2.1 establishes a necessary condition. It points
∗This is true only for the equilibrium based on linear strategies. Tsutsui and Mino5 is one of the first papers
dealing with nonlinear equilibria in linear quadratic deterministic differential games.
†In the class of games we analyze here, all variables are observable for every player.
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out that, for an MPNE to be robust, it must be the case that changes in shadow prices have
constant variance. Theorem 2.1 is complemented with Theorem 3.1, which solves an inverse
problem to determine utility functions that make the certainty equivalence principle hold.
The study of inverse optimum problems in economics has a long history, starting with Hahn9
and Kurz;10 Chang11 extended the approach to the stochastic optimal growth model, and He
and Huang12 discussed a quite general inverse Merton’s model. When a policy function can be
rationalized by a well behaved utility function (i.e., strictly concave), it means that the pre-
scribed behavior is consistent with an optimizing behavior. Inverse problems are easily handled
with the Euler-Lagrange system of equations that directly characterizes the MPNE. Working
with these equations in stochastic differential games constitutes a novel approach introduced in
Josa-Fombellida and Rinco´n-Zapatero.13 It presents some advantages when studying questions
like those we address here. The Euler-Lagrange system is obtained from the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman system upon differentiation with respect to the state variables‡.
Theorem 3.1 applies to a class of scalar games with linear dynamics in the strategies of
the players. This class encompasses many interesting differential games. For instance, our
method allows us to extend the aforementioned dynamic advertising model studied in Sorger6§
and Prasad and Sethi.17 In addition, we study the noncooperative management of a stochastic
productive asset. We find that games with a linear recruitment function and constant elasticity of
variance (a CEV model) satisfy certainty equivalence for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility functions with a suitable coefficient of risk aversion. Our approach allows us to discover
new solutions in closed-form that, to our knowledge, are not available in the literature¶.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to the definition of the game and
to presenting some general results, including the Euler-Lagrange equations and the necessary
‡Rinco´n-Zapatero14 deals with deterministic games, allowing for non-smooth MPNE. See Josa-Fombellida and
Rinco´n-Zapatero15 for a derivation of the Euler-Lagrange equations from the Maximum Principle in optimal
control problems.
§The model is the duopoly extension of a model first proposed in Sethi16 in a single-player framework.
¶We have limited ourselves to the cases where we are able to find closed-form solutions, but Theorem 3.1 is a
general result.
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condition established in Theorem 2.1. Section 3 studies a class of scalar games with linear
dynamics in the players’ strategies that satisfies the certainty equivalence principle. Theorem
3.1 gives sufficient conditions for the existence of strictly concave utility functions for which the
MPNE is robust. An explicit expression for the player’s value function is also provided. Section
4 studies two applications: a general advertising game and a productive asset game.
2 Description of the game and general results
In this section, we briefly formulate a general stochastic differential game and provide results of
Euler-Lagrange equations that will be used along the paper. Standard references for differential
games are Mehlmann,18 Bas¸ar and Olsder19 or Dockner et al.20 We consider an N–person
differential game over a bounded or unbounded time interval. In the former case, T denotes
the final date. The state process, X(s) ∈ X ⊆ Rn, satisfies the system of stochastic differential
equations (SDEs henceforth)
dX(s) = f(s,X(s), u(s)) ds+ σ(s,X(s)) dw(s), t ≤ s ≤ T. (1)
Players’ strategies are denoted by ui ∈ U i ⊆ Rn, i = 1, . . . , N , and u = (u1, . . . , uN ) is a profile
of strategies. As it is common in many games, we will assume that the equilibrium strategies are
interior to U i for each i = 1, . . . , N . The random source is given by a d–dimensional Brownian
motion w(s) defined on a suitable probabilistic space. The instantaneous utility function of
player i is Li and the bequest function, Si. Given initial conditions (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X and an
admissible profile u, the payoff function of each player to be maximized is
J i(t, x;u) = Etx
{∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t) Li(s,X(s), u(s)) ds+ e−ρ
i(T−t)Si(T,X(T ))
}
, (2)
where Etx denotes conditional expectation, given the initial condition X(t) = x. All functions
that describe the game are of class C2, and ρi ≥ 0 is the rate of discount, which is supposed to
be strictly positive for all i in the infinite horizon case. In this case, the bequest functions Si
are null.
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Definition 2.1 (Admissible strategies) A profile u is admissible if ui(t) ∈ U i, all t ∈ [0, T ],
for i = 1, . . . , N and
(i) for every (t, x), (1) admits a pathwise unique strong solution;
(ii) for each i = 1, . . . , N, there exists a function φi with φit, φ
i
tx and φ
i
xx continuous, such that
ui(s) = φi(s,X(s)) for every s ∈ [0, T ].
Let U i be the set of admissible strategies of player i and let U = U1 × · · · × UN .
Definition 2.2 (MPNE) An N–tuple of strategies φ ∈ U is called a Markov Perfect Nash
Equilibrium if for every (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×X , for every ui ∈ U i
J i(t, x; (ui|φ−i)) ≤ J i(t, x;φ),
for all i = 1, . . . , N .
In the above definition, (ui|φ−i) denotes (φ1, . . . , φi−1, ui, φi−1, . . . , φN ).
Along the paper, we will use subscripts to denote partial derivatives, and primes to denote
scalar derivatives. Also, ∂z denotes total derivation with respect to the variable z; and for a
matrix A, tr(A) is the trace of A, A> denotes the transpose of A and A−> denotes the transpose
of the inverse of A, A−1.
Given an MPNE φ, the value function of player i is V i(t, x) := J i(t, x; (φi)), the deterministic
Hamiltonian is H i(s, x, u, pi) := Li(s, x, u) + (pi)>f(s, x, u), and the costate function is
Γi(t, x, u) := −f−>
ui
Liui(t, x, u), (3)
i = 1, . . . , N .
As shown in Josa-Fombellida and Rinco´n-Zapatero,13 an interior and smooth MPNE φ sat-
isfies the Euler-Lagrange system of differential equations
−ρiΓij(t, x, φ(t, x)) + ∂tΓij(t, x, φ(t, x)) + ∂xjH i(t, x, φ(t, x),Γi(t, x, φ(t, x)))
+ 12∂xj tr
(
σ(t, x)σ(t, x)>∂xΓi(t, x, φ(t, x))
)
= 0,
(4)
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with final conditions φi(T, x) = ϕi(x), for j = 1, . . . , N , given implicitly by
Γi(T, x, φ(T, x)) + Six(T, x) = 0,
for i = 1, . . . , N and j = 1, . . . , n.
In the case where the game is autonomous, of infinite horizon, and the MPNE is stationary,
the term ∂tΓ
i(x, φ(x)) = 0 vanishes.
Now, consider the associated deterministic game by taking σ = 0, so that the state equation
becomes
dX(s) = f(s,X(s), u(s))ds, s ∈ [t, T ], (5)
with initial condition X(t) = x. The objective of the ith player is to maximize in ui ∈ U i
J i(t, x;ui|u−i) =
∫ T
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)Li(s,X(s), u(s))ds+ e−ρ
i(T−t)Si(T,X(T )), (6)
i = 1, . . . , N , once the remaining players have fixed their strategies u−i ∈ U−i.
Definition 2.3 (Robust MPNE) We say that an MPNE of the associated deterministic game
(5), (6) is robust if it is also an MPNE of the stochastic game (1), (2).
Theorem 2.1 Suppose that φ is a robust MPNE of the deterministic game. Then there exist
functions Ai(t), such that for all i = 1, . . . , N , for all x ∈ X , for all t ∈ [0, T )
tr
(
(σσ>)(t, x)∂xΓi(t, x, φ(t, x))
)
= Ai(t). (7)
Proof. System (4) also characterizes the deterministic game, which is obtained when σ is
the null matrix. This is because the maximization condition of the Hamiltonian, for both the
deterministic and the stochastic game, is the same, since σ is independent of the strategies of the
players. This implies that Γi(t, x, u) is also the costate variable of player i in the deterministic
game. Hence, if φ is an MPNE of both the deterministic and the stochastic game, then the
vector
∂x tr
(
(σσ>)(t, x)∂xΓi(t, x, φ(t, x))
)
must be null for all i = 1, . . . , N ; hence, tr
(
(σσ>)(t, x)∂xΓi(t, x, φ(t, x))
)
may depend only on t.

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3 A class of differential games satisfying the certainty equiva-
lence principle
From now on, we will focus on the infinite horizon game and on a particular class of stochastic
differential games that satisfy the certainty equivalence principle. To carry out this identification,
we solve an inverse problem, which consists of, given the rest of the elements that define the
game, finding well behaved utility functions (i.e smooth and strictly concave in each players’
strategies) for which the certainty equivalence principle is satisfied. To do so, we use the Euler-
Lagrange equation (4) for both the deterministic and the stochastic games, and the necessary
condition established in Theorem 2.1.
The particular inverse problem we study can be described as follows. The functions involved
have the degree of smoothness required in the previous section. Let the evolution of the scalar
state variable be
dX(t) =
(
−
N∑
i=1
ai(X(t))u
i(t) + b(X(t))
)
dt+ σ(X(t))dw(t), (8)
where the functions ai and b are given and with a continuous derivative. We assume that
the functions ai are not null. Moreover, they are monotone (not necessarily strictly) for all
i = 1, . . . , N . The objective is to find a strictly concave utility function `i(u
i) such that, given
the functions hi(x), i = 1, . . . , N , the game with payoffs
Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−ρ
it
(
`i(u
i(t)) + hi(X(t))
)
dt (9)
admits a robust MPNE. Hence, the utility function is Li(x, ui) = `i(u
i) + hi(x). Note that the
game is autonomous, so we have eliminated the time dependence in the interval of integration
and in the expectation. In what follows we will denote
Θ(x) =
∫ x 1
σ2(v)
dv, (10)
the antiderivative of 1/σ2(x), with null constant.
Summing up, given the tuple ((`i), (hi), (ai), b, σ), the inverse problem consists of finding
utility functions `1, . . . , `N with suitable properties, such that the game admits the same MPNE
7
as the associated deterministic game, ((`i), (hi), (ai), b, 0). The next proposition establishes that
a robust and smooth MPNE must satisfy a system of linear differential equations, where the
expression of the unknowns functions `1, . . . , `N do not appear explicitly.
Proposition 3.1 If the game (`i), (hi), (ai), b, σ) admits a robust MPNE φ, then there exist
constants Ai, Bi such that φ satisfies the system of linear linear differential equations
(AiΘ(x) +Bi)
N∑
j 6=i
(φj)′(x)aj(x)
= −
N∑
j=1
(
Ai
σ2(x)
aj(x) + (A
iΘ(x) +Bi)a′j(x)
)
φj(x)
+(b′(x)− ρi)(AiΘ(x) +Bi) + h′i(x) + A
i
σ2(x)
b(x),
(11)
for all x ∈ X , for i = 1, . . . , N .
Proof. If φ is a robust MPNE, then it satisfies the Euler-Lagrange equation (4) with σ = 0,
which for this game becomes (we omit the dependence of the functions on x)
−ρiΓi(x, φi) + ∂x
(
`i(φ
i) + hi(x) + Γ
i(x, φi)(−
N∑
i=1
ai(x)φ
i + b(x))
)
= 0, (12)
where
Γi(x, ui) =
`′i(u
i)
ai(x)
. (13)
Moreover, a robust MPNE satisfies, by Theorem 2.1,
∂xΓ
i(x, φi) =
Ai
σ2(x)
(14)
for some constant Ai, and for all i = 1, . . . , N . Then, integrating in the expression above
Γi(x, φi(x)) = AiΘ(x) +Bi
for another arbitrary constant Bi. From (13), `′i(φ
i) = ai(x)(A
iΘ(x) + Bi). Plugging (13) and
8
(14) into (12), we obtain that φ satisfies the linear system of differential equations
0 = −ρi(AiΘ +Bi) + `′i(φi)(φi)′ + h′i + ∂xΓi
− N∑
j=1
ajφ
j + b

+Γi
− N∑
j=1
a′jφ
j −
N∑
j=1
aj(φ
j)′ + b′

= −ρi(AiΘ +Bi) + (AiΘ +Bi)ai(φi)′ + h′i +
Ai
σ2
− N∑
j=1
ajφ
j + b

+(AiΘ +Bi)
− N∑
j=1
a′jφ
j −
N∑
j=1
aj(φ
j)′ + b′
 .
Rearranging terms, we obtain (11). 
Note that (11) is linear because the dynamics (8) is linear in the strategies of the players. We
could have set a general dynamics, at the cost of dealing with a nonlinear system for the robust
MPNE. As we wish, not only to give a theoretical result, but to find explicitly utilities and
equilibria, we make the simplifying assumption (8). Another advantage of our game problem
specification is that, as the system is linear, suitable assumptions on the coefficients would
guarantee the existence of a global solution, feature that is needed for the sufficient condition
given in the following result. We use the notation ζi for the inverse of φi, that is, x = ζi(φi(x)),
for x ∈ X , for i = 1, . . . , N . The inverse of φi exists under the assumptions of the theorem
below, and the monotonicity of functions ai and aiΘ. for all i = 1, . . . , N , are imposed in order
to obtain functions `i that are strictly concave.
Theorem 3.1 Suppose that aiΘ has a continuous derivative for all i = 1, . . . , N , where Θ is
defined in (10) and that the functions ai and aiΘ are monotone, with at least one of them
strictly monotone, for all i = 1, . . . , N . Let φ be a solution of the system (11) for which each
φi is twice continuously differentiable and strictly monotone in X , such that (8), with initial
condition X(t) = x, admits a unique strong solution Xφ for each (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)× R. Let
`i(u
i) =
∫ ui (
AiΘ(ζi(v)) +Bi
)
ai(ζ
i(v))dv, (15)
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with Ai, Bi constants, and let V i be defined by
ρiV i(x) = `i(φ
i(x)) + hi(x)−
(
AiΘ(x) +Bi
) N∑
j=1
aj(x)φ
j(x)
+(AiΘ(x) +Bi)b(x) +
Ai
2
,
(16)
and suppose that the following transversality condition holds: for all ui ∈ U i,
lim inf
T→∞
e−ρ
iTEtxV
i(Xu
i|φ−i(T )) ≥ 0, (17)
and
lim sup
T→∞
e−ρ
iTEtxV
i(Xφ(T )) ≤ 0, (18)
for i = 1, . . . , N . Then
(a) The function `i is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave for suitable constants
Ai, Bi, for all i = 1, . . . , N .
(b) The infinite horizon game ((`i), (hi), (ai), b, σ) has φ as a robust MPNE.
(c) The function V i is the (strictly concave) value function of player i, for all i = 1, . . . , N .
Proof. It is clear that `i is twice continuously differentiable, for i = 1, . . . , N . Taking the
derivative in (15) we obtain
`′i(u
i) = ai(ζ
i(ui))(AiΘ(ζi((ui)) +Bi).
Deriving again and collecting terms, we have
`′′i (u
i) = (ζi)′(ui)
(
Ai(aiΘ)
′(ζi((ui)) +Bia′i(ζ
i(ui))
)
. (19)
We want to show that it is possible to choose suitable constants Ai and Bi such that `′′i (u
i) < 0,
for i = 1, . . . , N . This will prove (a). Note that (ζi)′ has the same sign of (φi)′. By assumption,
this is positive or negative for all x ∈ X , since φi is strictly monotone. Assume, without loss
of generality, that (ζi)′ > 0 for some player i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Since that both aiΘ and ai are
monotone, and that at least one of these two functions is strictly monotone, it is possible to
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select constants Ai 6= 0 and Bi 6= 0 such that Ai(aiΘ)′ ≤ 0 and Bia′i ≤ 0 for all x ∈ X , and at
least one of these two expressions is negative for all x ∈ X . Thus, `′′i (ui) < 0 as claimed. The
case (ζi)′ < 0 is handled in the same way. This shows (a). We will prove (b) and (c) at once. We
start by showing that (16) defines a solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (HJB
henceforth) of the stochastic differential game. To this end, let us compute the first and second
derivatives of V . Note that, in fact, recalling that Γi = AiΘ +Bi, we have
ρiV i(x) = `i(φ
i) + hi(x) + Γ
i(x, φi)
− N∑
j=1
aj(x)φ
j + b(x)
+ Ai
2
. (20)
Hence, given that φ satisfies (12)
−ρiΓi(x, φi) + ∂xρiV i(x) = 0,
we have (V i)′(x) = Γi(x, φ(x)) = AiΘ(x) +Bi and (V i)′′(x) = A
i
σ2(x)
. Then
−ρV i +H i(x, φ, (V i)′) + 1
2
σ2(V i)′′
= −ρiV i + `i(φi) + hi(x) +
(
−
N∑
i=1
ai(x)φ
i + b(x)
)
(V i)′ +
1
2
σ2(V i)′′
= −ρiV i + `i(φi) + hi(x) +
(
−
N∑
i=1
ai(x)φ
i + b(x)
)
Γi +
Ai
2
,
which is null by (20). Hence, we have proved
−ρiV i(x) +H i(x, φ, (V i)′) + 1
2
σ2(V i)′′ = 0.
On the one hand, we have by definition that Γi(x, φ(x)) =
`′i(φ(x))
ai(x)
; on the other hand, (V i)′(x) =
Γi(x, φ(x)). Hence, `′i(φ
i)−ai(x)(V i)′ = 0 or, in terms of the Hamiltonian, H iui(x, (ui|φ−i), (V i)′) =
0 for all ui, for all i = 1, . . . , N . Since the Hamiltonian
H i(x, (ui|φ−i), (V i)′) = `′i(ui) + hi(x) +
−ui − N∑
j 6=i1
aj(x)φ
j + b(x)
 (V i)′
is strictly concave in ui because `i is strictly concave, a critical point of the function u
i 7−→
H i(x, ui|φ−i, (V i)′(x)) is a (unique) global maximum. Hence
H i(x, (ui|φ−i), (V i)′(x)) = max
ui
H i(x, (ui|φ−i), (V i)′(x))
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for all ui, i = 1, . . . , N . Thereby, the HJB equation for a MPNE,
0 = −ρiV i + max
ui
H i(x, (ui, φ−i), (V i)′) +
1
2
σ2(V i)′′,
holds. Finally, the transversality conditions (17) and (18) allow us to apply a Verification
Theorem, see Fleming and Soner21 Ch. III Th. 9.1—turning minimizing to maximizing— or
Dockner et al.20 Th. 8.5. 
Remark 3.1 (Control Problem) Note that in control problems, N = 1, (11) is an algebraic
equation, not a differential one. Introducing the notation ai = a, hi = h, A
i = A and Bi = B
for all i = 1, . . . , N , we have, after solving for φ
φ(x) =
(b′ − ρ)(AΘ(x) +B) + h′(x) + A
σ2(x)
b(x)
A
σ2(x)
a(x) + (AΘ(x) +B)a′(x)
,
as a candidate for robust control.
Remark 3.2 (Symmetric Game) Consider a symmetric game with N > 1 players and let φ
be a robust symmetric MPNE. As in the remark above, we denote all functions and constants
defining the game without indexes, as well as the introduced constants A and B. Observe that,
with the assumptions of Theorem 3.1, the sign of AΘ(x) +B is well defined, positive or negative
for all x. The linear ODE (11) takes the form
φ′(x) = P (x)φ(x) +Q(x), (21)
where the coefficients are
P (x) =
N
1−N
(
A
σ2(x)(AΘ(x) +B)
+
a′(x)
a(x)
)
;
Q(x) =
1
(N − 1)a(x)
(
b′(x)− ρ+ h
′(x)
AΘ(x) +B
+
Ab(x)
σ2(x)(AΘ(x) +B)
)
.
An integrating factor is |AΘ(x) + B| N1−N a(x) N1−N . In consequence, the general solution of (21)
is
φ(x) = |AΘ(x) +B| NN−1a(x) NN−1
(∫ x
Q(z)|AΘ(z) +B| N1−N a(z) N1−N dz + C
)
,
where C is an arbitrary constant. This is a candidate for robust MPNE, for the game with the
utility function `i as given in (15). We will use this formula in Section 4.2 below.
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Remark 3.3 (Linear Value Functions) It has been proven in Theorem 3.1 that (V i)′(x) =
Γi(x) = AiΘ(x) + Bi. Hence, the value function is linear in x for player i if it is possible
to choose Ai = 0. Note that it is not possible to take Θ(x), defined in (10), constant because
1/σ2(x) 6= 0. It is important to note that, from (19) in the proof of the theorem, the selection
Ai = 0 is possible only if a′i does not vanish; otherwise, the function `i constructed in the theorem
is not strictly concave, and there is no guarantee that the solution of the system (11), be a Nash
equilibrium of the Hamiltonians of the players. See Section 4.1 below for a game with linear
value function.
4 Examples
We analyze two stochastic differential games with a different structure. The value function of the
first game is linear, which explains why the MPNE satisfies certainty equivalence. The second
game’s value function is of the CRRA family.
4.1 A dynamic advertising game
Consider the stochastic differential game of competitive dynamic advertising of two firms studied
in Sorger6 in its infinite horizon formulation. Two firms compete for market shares through
advertising effort. We denote the market share of firm 1 at time t by X(t) and assume that
the size of the total market is constant over time. Normalizing the total market to 1, we obtain
that 1 − X(t) is the market share of firm 2 at time t. Let us denote then X1(t) = X(t) and
X2(t) = 1 − X(t), so Xi(t) represents the market shares of firm i at time t. The objective
functional for firm i is
J i(t, x;u1, u2) = Etx
∫ ∞
0
e−ρ
it
(
qiXi(t)− Ci(ui(t))
)
dt,
i = 1, 2, and dynamics
dX(t) =
(
δ1(1−X(t))
1
1+m1 u1(t)− δ2X(t)
1
1+m2 u2(t)− δ(2X(t)− 1)
)
dt
+σ(X(t))dw(t),
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X(0) = x ∈ X = [0, 1], where mi > 0, for i = 1, 2. The cost function Ci has to be determined
so that the MPNE of the game is robust. The model specification in Sorger6 is obtained with
Ci(u
i) = ci
(ui)2
2 and m1 = m2 = 1, δ1 = δ2 = 1, δ = 0. Prasad and Sethi
17 allows for
δ1, δ2, δ > 0. In the above, u
i(t) is the advertising rate at time t, ρi > 0 is the constant discount
rate and qi > 0 is the constant revenue per unit of market share of firm i, for i = 1, 2. The
diffusion parameter σ(x) ≥ 0 satisfies σ(0) = σ(1) = 0. The state dynamics reflects two facts,
already present in the classical Vidale-Wolfe advertising model, Vidale and Wolfe:22 (i) a concave
saturation effect in the capture of new costumers, and (ii) a positive (resp. negative) effect of
own (resp. competitor) advertising spending. In comparison with the original game, we allow
here for asymmetric market responses, even if the advertising effectiveness parameters δ1 and
δ2 are equal. The churn parameter δ > 0, accounts for declining effects in market shares due to
other causes than advertising from the competitor firm, such as product obsolescence or lack of
product differentiation.
In the notation of Section 3, a1(x) = −δ1(1− x)
1
1+m1 , a2(x) = δ2x
1
1+m2 , b(x) = −δ(2x − 1)
and h1(x) = q1x, h2(x) = q2(1− x). By (3)
Γ1(x, u1) = C ′1(u
1)δ1(1− x)−
1
1+m1 , Γ2(x, u2) = −C ′2(u2)δ2x−
1
1+m2 .
Linear value functions require (see Remark 3.3)
C ′1(u
1(x)) = B1(1− x) 11+m1 , C ′2(u2(x)) = −B2x
1
1+m2
for suitable constants B1 > 0, B2 < 0, so (7) is satisfied independently of σ(x). We still have to
check that the these two strategies solve the system (11), which in this particular game become
(with Ai = 0)
B1δ2x
1
1+m2 (u2)′ = −B1 δ1
1 +m1
(1− x)
−m1
1+m1 u1 −B1 δ2
1 +m2
x
−m2
1+m2 u2
+ B1(−2δ − ρ1) + q1,
−B2δ1(1− x)
1
1+m1 (u1)′ = −B2 δ1
1 +m1
(1− x)
−m1
1+m1 u1 −B2 δ2
1 +m2
x
−m2
1+m2 u2
+ B2(−2δ − ρ2)− q2.
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The structure of these equations suggests a solution (u1, u2) of the form u1(x) = η1(1− x)
m1
1+m1 ,
u2(x) = η2x
m2
1+m2 , with ηi > 0, i = 1, 2. After substitution and collection of terms, the above
differential system reduces to the following pair of algebraic relations
B1
(
η2δ2 + η1
δ1
1+m1
+ 2δ + ρ1
)
− q1 = 0,
B2
(
η1δ1 + η2
δ2
1+m2
+ 2δ + ρ2
)
+ q2 = 0.
(22)
Let ζ1(v) = 1− ( vη1 )
1+m1
m1 and ζ2(v) = ( vη2 )
1+m2
m2 , the inverse functions of u1 and u2, respectively.
From (15), we have the cost functions (remember that Ai = 0)
−C1(u1) = B1
∫ u1
a1(ζ
1(v))dv = −B1δ1 1
η
1
m1
1
(u1)
1+ 1
m1
1 + 1m1
;
−C2(u2) = B2
∫ u2
a2(ζ
2(v))dv = B2δ2
1
η
1
m2
2
(u2)
1+ 1
m2
1 + 1m2
.
If we denote c1 = B
1 δ1
η
1
m1
1
and c2 = −B2 δ2
η
1
m2
2
, then both c1, c2 > 0. Solving for B
1 and B2 and
plugging these values into the system (22), we obtain
c1η
1
m1
1
(
η2δ2 + η1
δ1
1 +m1
+ 2δ + ρ1
)
− δ1q1 = 0,
c2η
1
m2
2
(
η1δ1 + η2
δ2
1 +m2
+ 2δ + ρ2
)
− δ2q2 = 0.
Given ci, mi, ρ
i, qi, δi, i = 1, 2 and δ, the existence of positive solutions η1, η2 of this algebraic
system guarantees the existence of a robust MPNE φ(x) = (η1(1 − x)
m1
1+m1 , η2x
m2
1+m2 ). This is
because the SDE for the optimal path Xφ is linear, hence a unique strong solution exists. It is
straightforward to check the rest of the conditions of Theorem 3.1, including the transversality
conditions, since the value functions are linear, as can be easily realized from (16).
4.2 A stochastic productive asset game
In this section, we consider an N player symmetric noncooperative differential game where each
player i consumes at rate ci ≥ 0 from a stochastic productive asset X. The payoff functional is
J i(t, x; (c1, . . . , cN ) = Etx
{∫ ∞
t
e−ρ
i(s−t)`(ci(s))ds
}
,
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subject to
dX(s) =
(
F (X(s))−
N∑
i=1
ci(s)
)
ds+ σ(X(s))dw(s), X(t) = x > 0. (23)
Function F is the recruitment/production function. The class of admissible strategies U i for each
player is as in Definition 2.1, with the additional condition that X ≥ 0 almost sure is required,
that is to say X = [0,∞). Further conditions on U i will be given in each of the specific cases we
consider below. This game has been analyzed in Josa-Fombellida and Rinco´n-Zapatero,13 where
we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a unique and smooth MPNE of
the finite horizon game.
According to Remark 3.2, and taking B = 0, a robust equilibrium must satisfy (21) with
coefficients
P (x) =
N
1−N
σ2(x)Θ(x)
, Q(x) =
1
1−N
(
ρ− F ′(x)− F (x)
σ2(x)Θ(x)
)
. (24)
Recall that Θ is the primitive of 1/σ2(x) with null constant. We consider a linear production
function‖, F (x) = µx, µ ≥ 0, and assume a CEV model, σ(x) = σxa, with 1− 12N < a < 1 and
ρ > 2µ(1− a). We have
Θ(x) =
1
σ2(1− 2a)x
1−2a, P (x) =
N
1−N
1− 2a
x
, Q(x) =
ρ+ 2µ(a− 1)
1−N .
Function Θ is negative since a > 12 , hence we take A < 0 and B = 0. In this case, by Remark
3.2, φ(x) = βx + ηx(2a−1)N/(N−1) is a solution of (24), where β = ρ−2µ(1−a)1−2N(1−a) is positive given
our assumptions, and η ≥ 0. Note that φ is smooth, positive and increasing in (0,∞) and
φ(0) = 0. We consider only the case with η = 0, so the inverse of φ is ζ(c) = c/β. Substituting
into (15) and taking A = σ2(1 − 2a)β1−2a, we find that the utility function is of the CRRA
class, L(c) = c
2−2a
2(1−a) . Denoting θ ≡ 2a − 1, we obtain an isoelastic utility function L(c) = c
1−θ
1−θ .
The constraints on a imply 1 − 1N < θ < 1. In terms of θ, the diffusion coefficient is then
‖We have also solved the inverse problem for linear F and σ, as well as for a square root recruitment function,
F (x) = µ
√
x, and linear σ. Readers interested in the details will receive a copy of our computations and proof of
optimality upon request.
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σ(x) = σx(1+θ)/2. At equilibrium, the asset evolves according to the SDE
dXφ(s) ≡ dX(s) = (µ−Nβ)X(s)ds+ σX(s)(1+θ)/2dw(s), X(0) = x > 0. (25)
Regarding the existence of solutions to (25), the functions 1/σ2(x) and x/σ2(x) are locally
integrable Borel functions in (0,∞). Indeed, both functions are continuous on any compact
subset of (0,∞), and are thus integrable. Hence, the SDE (25) admits a unique-in-law weak
solution, see Karatzas and Shreve23 Ch. V, Th. 5.15. In fact, since the coefficients are locally
Lipschitz, (25) admits a pathwise unique strong solution up to exit time of the interval (0,∞),
see Karatzas and Shereve23 Ch. IX, Ex. (2.10). To continue with the proof, we restrict the
class of admissible strategies U i to those elements ci which satisfy 0 ≤ ci ≤ kx for suitable k.
For ci ∈ U i, let the process Xci be given by
dXc
i
(s) = (µXc
i
(s)− ci(s)− (N − 1)βXci(s))ds+ σ(Xci(s))(1+θ)/2dw(s),
Xc
i
(0) = x >. Let Xˆ with Xˆ(0) = x and
dXˆ(s) = (µ− k − (N − 1)β)Xˆ(s)ds+ σXˆ(s)(1+θ)/2dw(s). (26)
By a comparison theorem in Ikeda and Watanabe,24 Xc
i ≥ Xˆ. Let µ0 = µ− k − (N − 1)β. By
Example 3.2 in Mijatovic´ and Ususov,25 the exponential
M(t) = exp
(
−µ0
σ
∫ t
0
Xˆ(s)(1−θ)/2dw(s)− 1
2
µ20
σ2
∫ t
0
Xˆ(s)1−θds
)
is a uniformly integrable martingale, since 1+θ2 < 1. This implies that Xˆ ∈ (0,∞) with prob-
ability one, see Theorem 2.1 in Mijatovic´ and Ususov.25 In consequence, V (Xc
i
(T )) is well
defined and V (Xc
i
(T )) ≥ V (Xˆ(T )) ≥ 0 a.e., so (17) in Theorem 3.1 trivially holds. On the
other hand, Xφ ≤ X˜, where dX˜(s) = µX˜(s)ds + σX˜(s)(1+θ)/2dw(s), and X˜(0) = x. Note that
e−µtX˜(t) = x+σ
∫ t
0 e
−µsX˜(1+θ)/2(s)dw(s) is a nonnegative local martingale, thus a supermartin-
gale, hence Ex(e
−µT X˜(T )) ≤ x. This implies that Xφ does not exit at ∞. Moreover, since the
value function is increasing and concave, then
Ex(V (X
φ(T )) =
A
1− θEx(X
φ(T ))1−θ ≤ A
1− θ (ExX˜(T ))
1−θ ≤ A
1− θx
1−θeµ(1−θ)T ,
by Jensen’s inequality. Thus, condition (18) holds, as we have supposed ρ > µ(1− θ).
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5 Conclusions
This paper studies whether the certainty equivalence property holds in games beyond the well-
known linear quadratic case and games with linear or logarithmic value functions. To approach
the problem through the value function and the HJB equations is not easy, at least when the
diffusion coefficient depends on the state variable, since then—with the exception of games
where the value function is linear—the value function will be different in the stochastic and in
the deterministic case. Hence, we have chosen to work with the Euler-Lagrange equations, which
deal directly with the MPNE. As the MPNE is the same for both games, the deterministic and
the stochastic, these equations provide a convenient tool to solve the problem. We have shown
how our approach can be used to find closed-form solutions to games for which a solution was
not known. We will try to explore this feature in new examples. Also, further research will focus
on analyzing games where the uncertainty is other than Brownian uncertainty.
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